Executive Summary
- •Researcher Dirk-jan Mollema demonstrated that malware can abuse the Windows ticketing process to register an attacker-controlled device and obtain a 90-day Primary Refresh Token.
- •The attack operates on TPM-backed systems without extracting the private key, recovering the PIN, triggering a biometric prompt, or needing administrator privileges.
- •By treating the Windows Hello key as a FIDO2 passkey via WebAuthn, an attacker satisfies Conditional Access policies requiring phishing-resistant authentication.
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Zubiqo Strategic Assessment
Primary Impact
Enterprise identity and access management teams relying exclusively on Windows Hello for Business and Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access policies for phishing-resistant MFA.
Strategic Shift
The transition of attack paths from traditional credential theft to local session hijacking, as threat actors exploit active endpoints to bypass hardware-backed identity controls.
The Ripple Effect
Organizations will deploy strict endpoint detection rules hunting for empty device IDs during Windows Hello sign-ins to catch silent FIDO2 passkey abuse.
This intelligence assessment is generated by Zubiqo's AI for informational purposes only.




