Executive Summary
- •IPinfo reports that RPKI-valid internet routed prefixes climbed from 54.0% in September 2025 to 70.3% in September 2026.
- •China increased its IPv4 addresses in RPKI-valid routes from 3.7% to 83.0% over the year, while nearly 60% of unprotected routed IPv4 space remains in the US.
- •Because 16.2% of covered IPv4 routes and 20.9% of IPv6 routes use loose ROA permissions, roughly 18M more-specific prefixes remain exposed to forged-origin hijacks.
Community Sentiment
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Key Developments & Data
Zubiqo Strategic Assessment
Primary Impact
Global internet service providers, cloud hosting operators including Hetzner, DigitalOcean, and Contabo, telecom carriers, and enterprise network administrators managing Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing tables.
Strategic Shift
Internet routing security is transitioning from unverified trust to cryptographic origin validation via RPKI and early path verification via ASPA, though loose maxLength configurations continue to permit valid forged-origin sub-prefix hijacks.
The Ripple Effect
Unless network operators tighten maxLength settings in line with RFC 9319 and expand ASPA path validation, attackers can continue forging origin announcements across roughly 18M uncontested more-specific prefixes to intercept traffic and obtain legitimate TLS certificates.
This intelligence assessment is generated by Zubiqo's AI for informational purposes only.
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